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?cir? T 
Plaintiff's counsel failed to -defend him a*, every stage of 
the proceedings against him. Utah Code 77-32-3 (a), minimum standards 
provided. 
The plaintiff's counsel failed to protect him from a probation 
hold that was put on him for a charge that he had already expirated 
with no violations. '["here was no notice, no order to show cause hearing, 
and no Affidavit of Violation issued. Counsel was made aware of the 
circumstances and refused to intervene on the plaintiff's behalf. 
Thus he was sentenced to one year in jail and denied bail on his pending 
charge in Salt Lake. See Utah Code 77-18^1, 10 (a), 11 (a), and 12 
(a,b,e,d,). 
Plaintiff's counsel helped prosecution to set up a deposition 
without the plaintiff's knowledge, presence or consent. This wes done 
without leave of court, or stipulation. See T'tah '."ode Rule 2?,30 (a), 
(f) 1),2),3), Rule 31 (a,b). Counsel secure;! plaintiff's alibi witness's 
attendance and did not attend the deposition herself to protect the 
plaintiff's rights and interests, and to keep the alibi, witness from 
unreasonably annoyed, embarassed, or oppressed. See Utah Code Rule 30 
(d), and Rule 32 (a), U.d.C.P. Numerous lies, misquoted facts and 
sC:U; •':'• :ss innu.end.os were presented during the deposition. ^he prosecut-
ion along with the plaintiff's counsel, conspired ;.og<:tricr to violate 
the plaintiff's statutorial an .i constitutional rights by jgnorinr clearly 
established statutes of law. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In United states v . -ie ie , vr3 IT, d. ( « ec7 ; , 
" 1 lus t ra t e s , " i. n a d A i t ia a t o o a un s e 1' s 
presence at trial, the accused is g aranted 
that he need not stand alone against trie 
State at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal-, in-court or out, where 
counsel's absence might delegate from the 
accused right to a fair trial.t? Ld. at 226. 
Plaintiff's counsel allowed a pre-sentence report with out-
right lies a.nd unfounded allegations to be presented to the court. 
This was done without informing the plaintiff as to these inaccurate 
entries so a defense could be establishe I before court and the judge 
could be ma.de aware of trie discrepancies. la ri psky, a noncapital case, 
this court held on a due process analysis that "fundamental fairness" 
requires that a defendant have the right to inspect a presentence report 
prior to sentencing so that a sentence will not be influenced by inac-
curate information. 608 F.2d at 1248. furthermore, if the defendant 
cannot inspect the cor-tents of the presentence report, hi;-.: nor c titu tional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel nt the time of sentencing 
is seriously impaired if a judge may rely on information which may be 
inaccurate and is unknown to the defendant. 
-fa defendant were not allowed to correct en error at the time 
of sentencing, the error is Likely to go undetected for as long as the 
defendant remains subject to the criminal justice system since the pre-
sentence report remain in the file on the defendant an I is used by the 
Board of far Ions and other authorities in mnXLug dec Is. ions as to the 
length and terms of his incarceration, and oarole. ',' tate v . ..a^ arez • 
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Plaint Lff's eounsHi failed to advise o i:' the ri^ a.t of appeal 
c f h is co:• v i c 11 on at the t i me of tr i a 1 , ar :; t se:11en;• i.ng . H~ >• as tc 1 d 
by an inmate at the prison that he had the right to aooeal. 6ee Utah 
Code 77-1-6 (g), 77-35-22 (c), donst. Amendment 6. 
plaintiff's counsel failed to sign plaintiff's commitment 
papers as to 'correctness of form, to protect the plain tiff from an in-
correct sentenc e impos ed by the cour t, -/hen p 1 aint if f was sen beno e his 
commitment papers were incorrect as to his sentence. There is a. section 
for the prosecution attorney arid defense attorney to -'ign it as to 
correctness of form. Plaintiff's attorney failed to do this because of 
her continuing lack of interst in the plaintiff's case. 
See Exhibit I 
Tfthe public defender is obligated to serve 
the interest of his clients.'1 Hover v. Towers, 
700 H\2d 556. 
There is nothing unreasonable, how- ' er, in aiae.-'i'ig to the 
proposition that it is the responsibility of a triad lawyer wno takes 
on the defense of another to be aware of his client's basic legal rights 
are! of the legitimate rules of the [V-rum iriv/hich he practices his pro-
fession. Tellett v. Henderson, supra. 411 P.;;. at 266-267, ^3 C.Jt. 
at 1608. 
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Counsel failed to interview the plaintiffs alibi witness 
at any time, except to tell her to go let 'the prosecution talk to her. 
Plaintiffs attorney did not channel her investigation on the basis of 
professional assessment of the prospects for success. Rather she 
abandoned her obligation to develope a case for the plaintiff, 
"attorneys must conduct a substantial in-
vestigation which includes, an independent 
examination of the facts, circumstances, 
pleadings, and lavs involved/1 Rutmnel v. 
jstelle, 590 F. 2d at 104; United States v. 
Moore, 554 V. 2d 1036, 1092-93, (:>.C. Jir;. 
1976). 
"effective counsel is obligated to conduct 
reasonably subtantial investigation into 
such line before proceeding to trial, and 
failure to investigation is clear example 
of breach of duty to investigate. USCA 
Const. Amend. 6, u ;y 641,13 (1) 
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Plaintiffs counsel knowingly entered l;he illegal deposition 
into evidence without laying any foundation or explaining to the jury 
as to what emphasis to place on it. 
plaintiff's counsel knew there wan some serious and prejudi-
cial problems with the deposition. First of all she wasn't even presen 
at this proceeding to protect the plaintiff's rights and cross-examine. 
She knev/ it was based on a person who was not the plaintiff. It also 
contained numerous implications of frequent drug use, moral and irreve-
lent issues* 
See Exhibit III 
"Defense counsel's errors or omissions must 
reflect a. failure to exercise the skill, 
judgement, or diligence of a reasonably com-
petent criminal defense attorney they must 
as a diligent conscientious advocate would 
not have made, for that is the constituional 
standard. Hooper v ?itzharris, S86 ?\ 2d i??5, 
1327 (9th) Cir. 
.An in-camera conference was held where she pointed out numerous 
joints she thought the 'jury might give weight to.' Then turns around 
&nd enters this damaging and prejudicial document which at the time was 
just a proposed document exhibit with only one change, (white out). 
See Exhibit IV 
6 
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Plaintiff's counsel did not know contents of letters written 
to the plaintiff's alibi witness before advising her to give them to the 
prosecution. This was done without the knowledge or consent of the 
plaintiff. Plaintiff's counsel was called by plaintiff's alibi witness 
after deposition a.nd ask if she should give the prosecution letters that 
she had received from the plaintiff. This call had to be made because 
of the plaintiff's counsel being voluntarily absent from the deposition 
hearing* Alibi witness was toll to give the prosecution any letters 
they wanted* These letters were obtained as the "fruits of the illegall 
held deposition." Only two letters wore chosen by the prosecution out 
Of a possible six to eight written by the plaintiff. ?hey were used to 
impeach the creditability of the plaintiff. The favorable letters were 
tlever entered by the prosecutor or the plaintiff's counsel to negate the 
implications that were being allegated by the prosecutor. Plaintiff's 
counsel was not come tan t enough to protect th---.- plaintiff, whoa she was 
aware that there were more letters. 
''Regarding the alibi evidence, an attorney has 
a duty to make reasonable investigations or to 
make a reasonable decision that ' ' '-;es particular 
investigations unneccessary." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. at 6 01, accord Kimrnelman 
v. Korrison, 54 U . 3.1 .'//. 4789, (U.o. June 26, 1986). 
According to the American Bar Association standards for the 
Defense Function, "more specific guidelines concerned counsel's duty to 
Confer with his client, promptly advise his client of his rights and 
take action necessary to preserve them. The jourt also held that if the 
/ 
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defendant showed a substantial violation of an/ of the stated requirements 
he had established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel 
and the burden shifted, to the goverment to show lack of prejudice. 
Under Chapman, "prejudice could be established 
by showing that it is reasonable to assume that 
the wrongfully admitted evidence influenced the 
case," See 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827. 
Plaintiff's counsel failed to make timely objections as to the 
contents of the letters obtain as the result of the deposition. Counsel 
for both sides had previous ruling from the bench and a few ground rules 
were set. One of them being that no prior had acts or; crimes could be 
brought up at-trial, because of the possible prejudice to the defendant* 
in the case* 
See exhibit V 
"the degree of possible prejudice that might 
f o r e s e e ab ly result f r o m s t r a t e g i o c h o i. o e i s 
a revelant factor." hooper v. 'itf//r i a r ri.s , 
586 1. 2d 1325,1330 n. 10 (-tii Oir.) U973) . 
in adhering to the teaching of Johnson v. /,orbst, will have 
to reconsider whether they can continue to Indulge the comfortable fiction 
that all lawyers are skilled or even competent craftsman in representing 
the fundamental right:; of their clents. 304 TT.0. 458, 53 8.0t., 1019* 
82 L.ed 1461. 
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KIFT IV 
Was not prepared to impeach the credinability of the witnesses 
by their prior statements. 
Mr. Leisure, (prosecutor1s witness), testified that the robber 
had brown eyes. The plaintiff has blue-green eyes. He t stified the 
robber as weighing between 245 to 265 lbs. The plaintiff weighs 190 
lbs. He describe the robber as a muscular weigh lifter, and said he 
was wearing a ski parka. Tough to know how muscular a person is with 
a winter ski parka on. Mr. Leisure's testimony of how long he viewed 
the robber in. the store face to face dwindled from over three minutes 
to five to seven seconds.' The prosecution's expert witness testified 
that he never lifted any latents (fingerprints) from the store counter. 
Police reports say he did and they were processed. Again to- Mr. Leisure, 
testified that he did pick another gentleman as the possible robber. 
sJoun.se] clearly lacked preparation and used a 'hit and miss approach1 
to the important issues throughout the trial. 
NOTE: This point can better be presented during and evident!ary he a ring 
and a discovery proceeding to obtain closing arguments and other necessary 
documents to give this crucial noint validity. 
o 
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01:. Oreo lies t see OKO'I 
ion, with a case that was clearly based on a singl1. 
Taojpility Inat cue t-
oi ' a-ss testimony. 
Plaintiff's counsel was face-'3 with a case that was clearly 
b-?sed on a. Single eyewitness testimony
 f with conflicting version cf 
• * . • • , 
description and events of the cri?ne, depend icri£ on who was asking the 
questions* Plaintiff's counsel was obviously 'j>r:'var,e of f h i • * crucial 
defenseinstruction available for a case cf this nature. 
In rtate v. Gray, dtaa, 6f1 f,^ ;i3 0:7 9}, 
it stated that: "cue who is su:-'pe.:ted or *conse-
of crime has (the) riyht tn have ^owpetant counsel 
who will take such actions cud. present whatever defenses 
and interpose whatever objection he can an I accused 
is entitled to (the) ess is to nee of - corn pet ant Tenibeo 
,-: of the K*c, 
Although not ' - • • ) . • ' ) v-i 
ccnu'v in .oe v • 
S e l d e r e d the q u e s t i o n of when iyriora 
ion of a d e f e n d a n t ' s ' ixbh A^ondnient 
Bel. J u d g e ' dke l ly b r i g h t , s i t t i n g b 
c f t! • •- ] : > v. ' f' :•;.' e 1 •*• s .1 • i a ':. - o:' i v a t — 
•'
;:ht of e f f e c t i v e ;u-u? i s t-uujo of coun 
"where t h e d e f e u s e i s s u b s t a n t i a 1 l y weekea.o': 
b e c a u s e of t h e unawaeen^ss on t h e o^"r*t of t h e 
d e f e n s e c o u n s e l of a r u l e of law rjesi.e to the 
C3.se
 f trie accused i s n o t y i e e n tv;,:' e f ! ' v ; c t i v e 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n y u a ^ n teed h ion by i h " ' " o r s t i f u t -
ioe. •" 
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The foregoing principle ind.ic3t.es thvt whether a valid claim 
for ineffective assistance has been stated in a case, such as this, upon 
unawareness of the law depends upon a. consideration of two factors: 
(1) The degree of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the unaware-
ness on the counsel's part of the rule of law giving rise to the defense, 
(2) the extent to which such a rule of law was "basic to the case. These 
same factors were considered by the Sixth Circuit in Eeasley when it 
enunciated the following principle: 
"Defense counsel must investigate all apparently 
substantial defenses available to the defendant 
and must assert them in a prooer and timely manner." 
491 F. 2d at 696, (emphasis added). 
Sixth Circuit emphasized that "defense counsel must perform 
at least as well as a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the 
criminal law and just conscienuously protect his client's interest 
Undeflected by conflicting considerations.1' 
This Court in State v. Brown, 607 I\Cd 261 (Utah 19&P) and 
State v. Castillot 457 ?.2d 618 (Utah 1969) held that a defendant in 
a criminal case is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory 
Of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support that theory. 
As the court noted in United States v. Tolfaire, 469 ?.?d at SS2: 
The presumption of innocence that safeguards the 
conmon lav/ system must he a premise that is real-
ized in instruction and not merely a promise. In 
pursuance of that objective, we have pointed out 
the importance of and need ioc special instruction 
on the key issue of identification, which emphasis 
11 
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; to the jury the need for finding that tAie cir-
cumstances of the Ldetifl.cation are convincing 
beyond a reasonable doubt* 
The movement clearly seems to be toward the giving of the 
instruction* Both the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have strongly recom-
mended the use of Telfaire instructions in cases where identification 
is a key issue* See United States v, Hodges, 515 ;?.2d 650 (7th Cir* 
1975): United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273 (4th Oir. 1974)• 
In more recent decisions like State v« Long, states: 
••••••Given the great weight jurors are likely to 
give eyewitness testimony, and the deep and generally 
unperceived flaws in it, to convict a defendant on 
such-evidence without advising the jury of the 
factors that should be considered in evaluating 
it could well deny the defendant due process of 
law under Article T, section 7 of the Utah Jonsti-
;.'• tution, !£• at 492. 
In. fact, even before this dourt's decision in hong, courts 
across the country called for; cautionary instructions regarding eye-
witness identifications* Clearly, particularly in the ila in tiff's 
case, the court was confronted with a situation where a Telfaire type 
instruction was not only warranted, out suite possibly crucial in deter-
mining the ultimate outcome of the trial. The instruction, if given, 
would have stated "what the jurors ought to look for in a given case to 
determine whether or not the identification is or is not reliable." 
Without the instruction there is a clear possibility that the plaintiff 
was denied his presuption of innocence by assigning undue //eight to the 
eyewitness testimony. The failure of the defense counsel v/as particularly 
prejudicial and warrants reversal on the ::eni..al of effective counsel. 
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favorable to the plaintiff. .-oust. '^erdnen t 6. 
Counsel toll plaintiff that she v/^ ul'i secure the attendance 
of ..dr. Heed Jones, (the first person picked •; a the robber), tn the trial. 
3he stated that he had said he would be £lad to attend. The day of trial 
I asked where Mr. Jones was , and counsel saiu hard to aet a 
person from the Utah State Prison. dli- obviously must nol be aware of 
.powers and penalities of a subpoena. '-he iv^ rd; into ;preet detail hov/ she 
would present.him to the jury and show his facial as well as phsyical 
similarities as one of our defenses. In most courts opinions they agree 
'that in order to previal in this, point you have to ^soeot how this point 
would have helped the case in. the ev^s of u'hr iu-.^v ond hov; vru were ore-
judieed by the absence or th- the defers--. Tn.-: ju.sy lid t.ot have the 
luxury to view fir. Jones and ascertain for teams--iven -s to the possi-
bilities of misidentifioation on the part or1 trie ptates1 v; i tress and the 
fragility of eyewitness identification, v.'ith two peepje in their view 
with- very similiar characteristics arid both auseects in the same ooime. 
Che plaint if!.'' was denied this hasij >a;a ti ta dion^l ai.aht by 
Counsel lack of interest, eomp atari :e, and preparation. 
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Knowingly an;} '••ilfuil; 
court* defense*, or p l a i n t i f f . 
•: "> r- K o c iti on without leave 
Mr, Iwasaki set up a deposition of the plaintiff's alibi witness 
nor the purpose that the prosecutor h -,:> v P p ! -i >,,,- run' at the r laintiffT s 
witness to better prepare his case. In meantime he ignored all statues* 
la.ws, and prerequistes governing the taking of depositions. 'Plaintiff 
was not aware of this proceeding until thre-1 dsye later. rv< seoution, 
evident by the numerous lies, and slandercss aoeusntions about the plain-
tiff was not aware of who he was prosecuting. They, (meaning Iwasaki, 
and Halph Tolinan were not made aware of who the plaintiff was until the 
day of Trial)« They were under the impression he was a known criminal, 
ex-eon, and frequent drug usev>. 
See '.xhiblt V. 
draban v. Peonl^, 7! oror ecu zi oni> 
knowing or reckless use of false O" mistaken testimony 
warrants reversal of the defendant's conviction).'' 
Having found prosecutorial ^vmr, . ih^ effect of a parti-
cular error on the jury verdict lias •-> factual .i i mension, the inquiry also 
requires the court to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence—whether the 
evidence properly admitted is such that no reasonable possibility exists 
that the errovT contributed to the ^cnvl:ti. r. fee 'hapman v. "alifornia, 
taP P " *>R o^ ;' | o£7 '• 
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Held a. special showing of the evidence in his chambers anJ 
hour before the trial, without defense counsel or the Plaintiff. 
According to the trial transcripts, the prosecutor took the 
two witnesses for the State behind closed doors of his office with 
Ralph Tolman his investigator, and a (convicted witness tamperer), 
and opened the plastic evidence bag a.nd had a 1 refresh your memory session 
with them*1 There were no stenographic facilities available, no defease 
counsel present, even though the transcripts indicate she jf-uld have 
been aware of this pre-trial showing of the evidence proceeding. 
State v, dagie Book, Inc. , ?3? >\2d 73, (1978), 
in part states: "the circumstances surrounding 
the preservation and custody of the article and 
the likelihood of tampering factors to be con-
sidered in determining it's ^dnissib iiity .,f 
Mat a v. Sumner , 6 i • :7. 2 d 7 r:> A , 753 (1 07 :•} , * \ igr; e s z i v a 
identification procedure: I.t!s holding has twr bases: 
1) "the pre-trial*...identification, procedure employed 
by (the prosecutor), was so impermissibly suggestive 
as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 
irreparable in-court misidentifioation of the...hat. 
"2) the admission of the in-court identification, 
constituted error of constitutional dimension." 
What makes this point viable is that both witness admitted 
during the trial that their testimony nearer to the time of the crime 
was inconsistant with their miraculous in-court identification, that 
the hat look like the one in the crime. it was only after the special 
.Showing that there testimony changed. It conflicted with the preliminary* 
U 
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The prosecutor with •; 11e joooera.tion of lefenso counsel obbaine 
personal letters from plaint iff !s alibi witness and sel^et^d the ones 
he felt would be most damaging to the plaintiff's creditability, knowing 
full well there were other letters with possible favorable statements 
and conversation. These letters were the tffruits of the slanderess, 
reckless, and illegally held deposition. 
In Agurs, case stated, "not just because.*.• 
prosecutorial misconduct," is involved, but 
more importantly because of the "corruption 
of the trial process." 4?7 U.S. at 104, 96 
S*St. at 2397^ 
"Due process is violated when the prosecutor, 
although not soliciting false ev i Aerice . . . . 
allows it to stand uncorrected when i appears. 
ftiglo v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-4 
(1972). 
See Exhibit VI* I -\ 
In an incamera conference the orc-'ecirfor objected to the 
correction of statements made by himself that were untrue about the 
plaintiff knowing they were based on ;-) person who was not the plaintiff. 
He was also aware of the prejudicial effects it would have on the case 
and the jury decision. 
Failure of prosecution to correction of false 
testimony which it knows to be false violates 
due process if there is any reasonable likeli-
hood that the false testimony could have affected 
judgement of jury. ?, Ian ton v . rleckbu m , Ui; Dist. 
Court, K.). Louisiana (19o0) 
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L/rj-:ere'i e - ' i e e n a e 
t e k e n irorn t h e p l a i n t i f f , 
r e q u i r e ] by THab Law. 
accorr'na.ui-r 
•? -1 *~, '• -"' n V '•* 0 e l V ' 1 
.:1 to 9 V .1 d 0;10 6 8 3 
The prosecutor entered evidence without "being familiar vv.i. hli 
the 'chain of evidence.* B1 a c k ?.» I. a v/ d- J. c 11 c r i a c y, states that.... M the 
one who offers real evidence nust -ceount fn^ th« custody of the evidence 
from the moment in which it reaches hiy custody until tte "lament in v/hich 
it i.^  offered into e^Llecoe/' 
The arresting detective duryl ".niccd stetesin reports that 
he took the hat from the plaintiffs pececn. The plaintiff was unaware.' 
that trie prosecution was claiming then- bec^u^o he did rot receive the 
pa/^ e of the police report containing this in "e>rme tier was :* on^ •••r iently 
t .;. 
•'.'•; - i s a t t o r n e y 
f twe:-v^-? wey r s 
i \ *•: ^. ^ i. I J • 11 ' I j_»•: . I ! i:. G .JL J> o; I :: .» '
 t; 
aware of t h i s d e c r e n - r i e y . i t * r seooa:,n. : 
Would j e o p a r d i s e h i e c a r e e r w i t h o e r j u r e d t e r i r i r ^ n y t o t r y t o h e l p the '" 
S t a t e o b t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n . The p l a i n t i f f i s ^ o t eo r t . e s t i n g os t o w h e n t h e r 
i t i s h i s h a t , h u t r a t h e r how t h e o o l i o e ob ta ined , i t , They o b v i o u s l y 
e i t h e r b r o k e i n t o my a o a r b ; r n t , o" e n t e r e d i n t o ny c o r i l ' l o y ^ l l y . 
N o t e : b u r i n s t h e a r r e s t de t ec t . ! vr- dnkroh 1-t t h e r i a l r i : f f l o c k vr h i s 
Apar tment and o b s e r v e d the n l a i n t i ff 1 r e h i e d the 
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no search warrant issued by the court for there enteranoe into the 
rlairitiff's apartment or oar, rnhe arresting officer apparently was i&-
norant of Utah '."ode that requires the issuing of a receipt when property 
is taken from a person persuant to an arrest. This is to protect the 
police as well as the plaintiff and established a 'chain o£ evidence.! 
Are these statues written only as token gestures of individual rights 
or are they to followed by the State too? Utah Jode 77-24-5, states: 
'
 n\vhen money or other property is seized with or without a 
warrant, the peace officer seizing it shall at the time deliver a 
receipt to the person from whom it is taken and file a duplicate in the 
office of the agency employing the officer. If the custody of the pro-
perty • is transferee! to another police agency ov the property is placed 
in evidence, a. copy of the receipt shall accompany it until disposition 
of the property is made in accordance with the provisions of this chapter 
Plaintiff are at the mercy of the ftate if laws written to 
protect them aren't followed especially when this illegally seized 
;is used as evidence against the plaintiff in trial. It is the iuty of 
officers of the lav/ to be abreast of lav/s of their .state and procedures1 
required of them when making arrests and seizing property. "^ he plaintiff 
is entitled to procedural due process especially when the illegally 
spi^ pri pvidpnnp r.lnyed en extremely significant part of the conviction. 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Objected to an J clouded evi.ienoe favorable to the jlaintiff 
during the trial* 
On two occasions the prosecutor knowingly and maliciously 
used tactics to mislead and cover-up evidence that would have had an 
impact on the decision making process of the jury. 
The prosecutor objected to the Rapsheet of the individual of 
whom the. deposition was based on thus covering the fact that this was 
the person until eight o'clock the morning of trial, they thought they 
W:.-re prosecuting. disclosure of this rapsheet would have shown, the jury 
the lack of investigation on the State's part of who they were prosecuting 
and the pretense of prosecution. 
See Exhibit VII 
On the second occasion the prosector v/.nt to great lengths 
to mislead the jury as to the fact that testimony as to the fact of the 
robber wearing a fu-man-chu mustache was incorrect. Two witnesses for 
the prosecution gave direct testimony that the night of the robbery 
the robber had a fu-man-chu mustache, one being the clerk of the store, 
and the other being the investigating officer at eerie. Then, the pro-
secutor produces one page of a. police report and s^ys that that statement 
was never made by the clerk and enters it intr evidence. 
during Trial the plaintiff had two people testify the;/ had / 
ilever seen him wean that style of mustache in r.h--- time they h?i known him. 
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allowed improper offer of evidence by the Prosecutor', 
Judge Billings allov/ed the prosecutor to hold a special showing 
of the evidence an hour before court to the State's two witnesses with-
out any recourse -on her pact after being made aware of this and the 
evidence taken out of the plastic bag, neither defense counsel nor plain-
tiff were invited, no stenographic facilities wore provided. There was 
no duplicate receipt aceoumpanying the evidence into her court. The 
Judge ws confronted with an issue of highly prejudicial nature and failed 
to. act and rule in her court. 
PC INT TI 
. ; Knowingly allowed an illegal deposition token without the court 
permission, and be entered into evidence. 
According to Utah statues a deposition has to have court leave 
to be held, unless certain critie'a exists, which didn't exist in the 
plaintiff's case. It was then presented in Jud(^ e Bl.i3.ings court which 
She had to know she did not authorize itfs taking. mrinr; th.^  trial 
she is presented with all kinds of facts of it!s prejudicial nature end 
about it being based on -:- different individual ;-nd net the plaintiff. 
Again she sets it aside at this critical sta^e and l-t it e;o in t- the 
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u 
X ' -C v JU -i. — O J 
- r e i u i i i c i ? . f e o t wa s c 13 iTT! e i an •;; i e f i ri i 
inrneeous f e l t by t h e p l a i n t i f f h - o ^ u s e of th 
l i e s t h e j u r y was a b l e t o read and n a k - j u d g e -
ments a b o u t t h e r l a i n t i f f. See bc<n,le v . J a r e , 
78 C a l . A op 3cJ 8 2 2 , 144 d a i . > v t r . '554 ( 1 9 7 « ; . 
7.£n r 0 ^ 1 '-> ,T .'-\ / -i '". (- ^ ', d o ^ f , - c • ; » , » J _-••;; / ; , :Tapue v, Illinois, J;bf
(!'a eonv i e tion obtaine 1 through ure of f-lse 
evidence, known to be su '.:h by representative! 
of the State, ?mst fall under the brew to nth 
Amendment) •" 
•fo instructions were given to the jury as to the oueooso of 
the letters after numerous obieetions bv defence counsel. 
It was decided by stipulation of the cnjo't that no reference;. 
to p.nlo.e bad acts or oriooes onl;! be •rruyhe ,_.y \:y -.he rr( -f,,»>.! t o r • 
i . i i v . ' *.-•<..<.; »j U I i ' . J. •• •:.*. i_ - . . >- ' .v v.„ v J I ••.. . J ). •.• ... * - -^ M v • ' 1 ' ' • . : L - • -L - < ' . . • ' . ' . . . ' • ; * ( • . - . . i . •.. . 1. 
c : u e t o t h e n 1 a i n t i f f! s f a t h ; j r .a:0i one t i .. o 1 
e i n y i n t r : r bdo in ^ o u n t i f u 1 , 
\\v~. 
Jud^re to take care of things out ther/^. It was orou 
of the court of the reference of olaietef< 
but the judge let the letters he entere-i ooywey. In. -\ on take 
court will not talk about prior crioe-', they Mb jxst let too juey *•-: 
about tlHrn. The supposed v^eueness PO the court out .it, v-s t-rvon r;r 
;1ar=oring to the pb^utiff, tooa.ose !t left s, enila ti co on the j-syh-
r^r t as to the Suve-rltc of th-. crime c" trecile :.n '^ cunt.'i ful. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
..' L '; I i ; . ! -Mi \J 
t i c n . jii an. La-camera. 
1:1 a n o ».h e r 1UC 1 i e'i 
V'1'. o^'jiJ"U).c t o e n t e r e d "'"h--
p i s j u t i f f 1 s - c o u n s e l a s tc w h e t h e r s h - had an 'dtp 
. c o n f e r e n c e she found ou t t h a t c o u n s e l ha 1 a r u b b e r of o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e 
p r o p o s e d e x h i b i t b e c a u s e of i t ' s *r . 'e judioi?.1 n a t u v e en / i t e r e l a t i o n -
s h i p to t h e ; p r i o r s t i p u l a t i o n made by b o t h r a e t i e e a b o n t f-i iogo r e l a t e d 
t o p r i c e bad a c t s end c r i m e s . To t r y and r< r r cdy . t ne ej tuo t i c t i ohe d e c i d e s 
t o t r y and c l e a n s e d t h e n;u£ -diet by e n t t n p ' - p o e t i e n of i t . \ntv body ' / 
f
, o • " " 
V/ith an Ii-^ i over thirty knov/o oo car': hell .To"!; - -:iu,.; eaot loooa ] ik :• • ; 
The judge by her lack oT covert proee'hare lei- v oojudioia.l ^a to rial to 
be published to the jury thus showing tbe defendant (plaintiff) in -i 
Very telling photo thus giving the jury definite- knowlcije of prior 
Criminal activities. The whole colloquy io presented in: 
•^- e o./.e .cjii/ ; J. i.. j 
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ledge, of the appeal process, and asks I him to sign an ^ffidr-7itf to 
the afreet of-his or^netonne and pro: .:8 3 J on^l ,ju dgement, ir\ the matter • 
at hand. He cooperated but tryed to delate almost all of the points 
the plaintiff had adamantly pleaded with him to outer, "ould this lack 
of v/anting to take the responsibility for his actions be getting caught 
in deceptive practices of a State appointed lawyer? 
See Exhibit IX 
The plaintiff's conviction was Affirmed by the otah Supreme 
Jourt, do he went into a Habeas ?or us remedy. The plaintiff attended 
a Motion to .dismiss hearing on the 23rd of January, 1987, and the 
Attorney General presented as one of their grounds Collateral review 
as a substitute for an appeal1 and the points presented could have or 
Should have been brought up on direct appeal. Thus what they were saying 
is that the Plaintiff was correct in his HSSessrion '• that toos- points 
Wore aooealable on the '-direct a area!f r:-med'r ned his lawver was untruth-
ful, (a liar), when he told the plaintiff " thosy w-rc irna npeala.ble in 
the direct appeal, and would.be better if brought up in a dadceas dcrpus 
proceed ing •" 
See Axhibit \. 
'vhen the plaintiff stood up in the p?oceed ing, (pro so), to 
address this issue with the judge about collate ral ad; tack with ca.se law 
about credit in;-7 fan uuusua" r i rnuens tan : ••-»! be --ilcc brou-~ht uu Mu -point 
£ • ' ' J - " • ••' "' : " " ' 
about ii is attorney ana cue orcblowo ho ouocin terad . 
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. This brought ur another iriter:.:-st ae: b-;s;;e i;ha t the rlai'^iff 
presented to the court, hut the judge refused tc let the plasties de-
velope in that hearing. -he issue is the State appointing me ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel on appeal. If the attorney General was 
correct on their assessment that I should have brought those points 
on my appeal, .which I assume they were, then my State appointed attorney 
was clearly ignorant and incompetant to represent me in the 'Supreme 
Court Appeal1. process and I have a very viable ?ase of ineffective as-
sistance of counsel on appeal, bv the fdemcstrateble realities' 1 have 
presented to this court • 
If I am incorrect in my assumptions, and my lawyer was correct 
in his judgements and presentations of my appeal to the Supreme Court, 
then the attorney General on paper and before the court made a malicious 
attempt to dismiss the plaintiff1 s Habeas ."o-r-gus, on leeeptive tactics 
and knowingly violated areoious rights guar-m teed the plaintiff in 'die 
Constitution. 
In conclusion, it is the duty cf this "ourt considering the 
implications and importance of this matter to the outcome of the plaintiff 
Struggle to get 'justice1 guaranteed all citizens of the Suited States, 
not just the ones in the 'black robes' and in positions to represent 
the law and make fair rulings according to the laws pertaining to this 
Subject matter-
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ii Appeal retusea to entertain num-
erous points the plaintiff wanted to be addressed in his Supreme dour' 
Appeal, which caused the plaintiff to nearly get his Habeas Sorpas 
attack bv the Third District Court. 
The plaintiff after motioning the court to dismiss his attorney 
o carol hesset-Sale, was appointed carl Xiaz for his first appeal from 
conviction to the Supreme Scurt. dr. X'iaz is under the impression that 
all inmates at the Utah State Prison are idiots ana ignorant of vcytuing 
to do with the law and its workings. So when the plaintiff questioned 
his judgement as to appealable issues he became quite outraged and frust-
rated. 
With research, into the matter the plaintiff became convinced 
that his attorney was knowingdp leaving out aapealable issues that should 
t
 :-i -? - o - - ^ ..*,-> * -.-, r-t 4 - . I DC i r O U g n t Up On tCe ''ll-i;, r-j^r^-i.- i/t-;:;icu. y , --.j.rLL r^-ueb o ?Ji.;-s id,vje.:--b 
directive. He filed a. pro se motion to the Third district court, Judge 
Judith Billings, for the additional information needed to present a 
factual addendum to his Appeal. This notion was igrored by the Court 
and Judge Billings, Thus the plaintiff was denied Taccess to the courts. 
See exhibit VIil 
After an extended period of time the plaintiff knew he was 
not coin?* to receive the materials renessspv to n^oteat himself in ^ r 
a.ddendum, so he called his lawyer up and Questioned his ethics ana know-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
Plaintiff,
 v (COMMITMENT) 
Case No. f g f t S - 3 H f t vs. I Case NO. t j.rv-3- . j - ip 
H o n o r a b l e ^ K E i l k Q ^ ^ 
ClerkC^Si 
Defendant. 
Reporter <K • i\trr\hy\rf-?0 J 
Bailiff L . B r rVJJU^ 
D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is a granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of 9iC^Ar^V^(^ fil>l fafi/Yt jLg a felony 
oi the JSitrdegree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in cdurt and ready for sentence and 
represented by. i l i C i ^ i ^ k ^ a n d the State being represented by g -t Ic^gQ , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
v to iJH^^i^Mll i^ctsttory term pt w , w ^ years and which may b e ^ ^ f o f f l T ^ w ^ ^ .^***J^J^& 
D not to exceed five years; —r* \ u e a r ^^ rva r^C f i r rCm" ' - * ^^ 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;' 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ , 
a and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
n such sentence is to run concurrently with 
c^such sentence is to run consecutively with i u f f ^ r Y = 3 0 C p r Y ^ ^ ' 
n upon motion of a State, • Defense, a Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Paple for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
S*l5efendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County S-fcf delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordant with this Judgment and Commitment. 
S-*C5mmitment shall issue 
n£B \ 
DATED this 2A day of O c f c & f l A , 19 S i ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: f ^ ^ ^ 7^ 7 /SuJu*Jy 
DURT JUD&E 
Defensfe Counsel 
a - J 5 I S T R I C T ( 
ATTEST 
H. DiXGN HiWOCEY 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VI A . . . . . J Afl 
Jl'DSraETJTrSENTENCE 
Plaintiff,
 v (COMMITMENT) 
vs. Case No. 
ftfonl bux^fi Ajm#)^
 m
 Count No
* 
Clerk 
Honorable
 rtyj\fttljiryfe 
ter & ,/gnrfcblQSg J 
Defendant. Date 2 1 r > f ^ b f l A 0 R f ^ 
Report  4s 
Bailiff ^ V ^ I ^ A O L U . 
• The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by p^jury; D the court; D plea of guilty; 
D plea of no contest; of the offense of fiffipqUftted—rsbbbaAU a felony 
of the .JfsfcTdegree, D a class misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and 
represented by ^ AV^dr-n^U^ and the State being represented by fc ^Onot^ , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: 
a to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
fl/of not less than-five years and which may be for life; \ \ uf- 4 t X dr*hc*T6EU4er^ 
D not to exceed years; 
a and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ; 
D and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $ to 
D such sentence Is to run concurrently with 
Csuch sentence is to run consecutively with 
O upon motion of a State, D Defense, • Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
D — — 
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Aduit 
Parole for the period of . pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
ta^Oefendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County Blor delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
©'Commitment shall issue Yrf-^XA LX;Vt-> 
DATED this _ 2 i _ day of 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
A DISTRICT COURT JUl ATTEST 
— • H. DIXON HINOLEY 
Defease Counsel ^ ^ ^ GM Oim&lA I H V & 5 
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A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH: SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
BY: "PAUL F. IWASAKI, DEPUTY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
SY: RALPH R. TOLMAN, INVESTIGATOR 
INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
c
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FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. IWASAKI: 
Q DID HE ASK YOU TO MARRY HIM? 
A NO. 
Q ANY TALK OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOU TWO? 
A NO. 
Q HOW OFTEN DID HE USE TO WORK OUT? 
A EVERY DAY. 
Q WHERE WOULD HE WORK OUT AT? 
A AT NAUTILUS ON STATE STREET. 
Q AND WOULD HE WEAR THE SAME KIND OF CLOTHES, THE 
SWEATPANTS AND THE OLD TEE-SHIRT, THAT YOU WERE TALKING 
ABOUT? WOULD HE WEAR THOSE TO WORK OUT IN? 
A I'M NOT SURE EXACTLY WHAT, YOU KNOW. I WASN'T 
THERE WHEN HE CAME HOME FROM THE SPA. 
MR. TOLMAN: THIS BASEBALL CAP, WAS IT HIS FAVORITE, 
OR DID HE WEAR OTHERS OR --
THE WITNESS: I HAVE SEEN HIM JUST WEAR THAT 
ONE. HE WOULD WEAR IT -JUST TO WORK OUT WHEN HIS HAIR 
WAS MESSY. THAT'S ABOUT IT. 
MR. TOLMAN: f^TT- L«[tf:^W*te?«} 
THE WITNESS: NO. 
MR. TOLMAN: *B~(OTHE :ABOTrrTTTT-FRIbCARRESTS? 
THE WITNESS: NO. 
MR. TOLMAN:
 <^&±S30tf 'TTOT^ 
25 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A SELDOM. 
Q HOW ABOUT -- YCU S IT THERE FROM, SAY, APPROXIMATELY 
kllQ UNTIL WHATEVER TIME BEDTIME IS ON MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 
1985, AND YOU DON'T RUN OUT OF MUCHIES AND HAVE TO RUN 
TO 7-11 OR GET ANOTHER SIX-PACK OF BEER. WHEN YOU JUST 
SIT THERE FOR A SOLID FIVE, SIX, EIGHT HOURS UNTIL IT'S BED-
TIME AND WATCH T.V., YOU HAVE ALL YOUR ACCOUTREMENTS THERE SO 
YOU DON'T HAVE TO LEAVE FOR ANYTHING? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER HAVING TO LEAVE FOR ANYTHING. 
Q NO POTATO CHIPS EVEN? 
A NO, NO. 
Q HAVE YOU EVER SEEN LARRY DO DOPE OF ANY TYPE, 
INCLUDING MARIJUANA? 
A AT WORK I'VE SEEN HIM. 
Q WHAT TYPES? 
A JUST MARIJUANA. 
Q NO L.S.D., COCAINE? 
A NO. 
C O N I T A I ^ ^ 
O'C-GIH^H^ 
A I WOULD SAY UNTRUTH. 
Q BUfjHE.'S NEVER DONE HEROINE^ 
A NOT THAT I KNOW OF. NOT SI-NCE I'VE BEEN WITH 
HIM. 
23-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TO THE CHANGES WHICH MS. NESSET-SALE WANTS MADE IN THE DEPO- : 
SITION OF MISS TERRY HARRIS. I DON'T THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE! 
W8h*j** 
uxmm 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE COURT WILL ALLOW THE WHITING 
OUT OF THE SENTENCE DEALING WITH PAROLE AS COURT FEELS THAT 
IT WOULD BE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE ON TWO GROUNDS. 
FIRST, THAT IT LEAVES AN UNTRUE INFERENCE BEFORE 
MS. NESSET-SALE: YOUR HONOR, I ALSO, AS I READ 
THIS THE NEXT QUESTION AND ANSWER WAS, "HOW DID YOU KNOW 
THAT," REFERRING TO THAT HE WAS ON PAROLE. "HE TOLD ME." 
IT'S — 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THAT'S OKAY. g ^ E S S ^ ! 5 1 | S ^ | 
MS. NESSET-SALE: THAT'S THE COMPLETE EXCHANGE. 
I THINK IT SHOULD BEGIN WITH, "WHAT DID HE TELL YOU IT WAS 
FOR"; IS THAT CORRECT? 
JUDGE BILLINGS: YES. 
(RECESS) . 
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IN CAMERA CONFERENCE 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE DEFENSE HAS A MOTION WHICH 
THE COURT IS RULING ON OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: IN THE DEPOSITION 'WHICH IS PRO-
POSED EXHIBIT 15 THERE IS AN ANSWER BY TERRY HARRIS IN RE-
SPONSE TO A QUESTION, YOU KNEW HE WAS IN JAIL FOR SOMETHING. 
HER RESPONSE YEAH, I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST FOR PAROLE, HE 
DIDN'T WANT ME TO KNOW. 
I GUESS I'M ASKING THE COURT TO ALLOW THE STATEMENT 
"I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST FOR PAROLE" TO BE WHITED OUT AND 
STRICKEN BECAUSE IT IS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT WHICH THE 
JURY MIGHT BELIEVE AND GIVE WEIGHT TO. 
r n nrrr TrfflU"' crcvnmBfc—i iHfejniiiirffiTT'TiTrTiTTiT"'Tr 
SBDcaaDBEr®^.?, ;4$&*v 
tOSt'—AND MR. IWASAKI ASKED, " 
THOSE TWO, THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWER, ALSO WE DELETED 
EITHER WHITED OUT AND REXEROXED OR COVERED WITH WHITE. I 
THINK IT HAS TO BE WHITED OUT. IT CAN'T 3E TEMPORARILY 
PAPERED OVER, ^^ssmss^^^^mmiBmmm^^^i^^^M^^BM^mm 
jaw*"""* 
JUDGE BILLINGS: YOU WANT TO SPEAK, MR. IWASAKI? 
MR. IWASAKI: YEAH, I WOULD FOR THE RECORD OBJECT 
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JUDGE BILLINGS: I BELIEVE THE DEFENDANT HAS RESTED;; 
IS THAT CORRECT? j 
MS. NESSET-SALE: YOUR HONOR, I WILL REST AS SOON | 
AS I MOVE TO ADMIT THE PROPOSED EXHIBITS 15 AND 22. THAT 
IS THE RED BAG CONTAINING THE SHOES, :l 
JUDGE BILLINGS: DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO 22, 
COUNSEL? 
MR. IWASAKI: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. IWASAKI: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 
15 AND 22 WERE OFFERED AND 
RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE). 
JUDGE BILLINGS: 
MS.NESSET-SALE: 
JUDGE BILLINGS: 
THANK YOU. 
WE DO NOW REST, YOUR HONOR. 
THANK YOU. THE TIME HAS COME 
WHERE I GET AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO YOU. YOU HAVE HEARD 
ALL OF THE EVIDENCE. NOW I WILL INSTRUCT YOU ON THE LAW. 
MR. BRADY WILL PASS OUT TO EACH OF YOU YOUR OWN COPIES OF 
THESE INSTRUCTIONS. 
AS I TOLD YOU EARLIER WITH THE PRELIMINARY INSTRUC-
TIONS YOU WILL BE ABLE TO TAKE THESE INTO THE JURY ROOM. 
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MAKE ANY PHONE CALLS AND YOU CANNOT TALK WITH ANYONE. j 
IF YOU HAVE TO COMMUNICATE IN ANY MANNER YOU SHOULoi 
DO THAT BY WRITTEN NOTE WHICH IS HANDED TO THE BAILIFF. j 
NOW, IF YOU'LL SWEAR MR. BRADY. j 
(WHEREUPON, THE BAILIFF, MR. BRADY. WAS \ 
SWORN IN). 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEFT THE COURTROOM 
TO BEGIN DELIBERATIONS AT 6:31 P.M.). 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I'M CONCERNED MR. IWASAKI MADE 
REFERENCE TO WHEN THEY READ THE LETTERS. CTHCKJi 
JUDGE BILLINGS: :g$0mmB& WE RECEIVED THOSE 
DOCUMENTS. I COULD NOT ALLOW HIM TO READ FROM THEM UNTIL 
THEY WERE IN EVIDENCE. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING OF THE RULES 
THAT YOU CANNOT READ FROM A DOCUMENT THAT'S NOT BEEN RE-
CEIVED. AND I BELIEVE THEY WERE RECEIVED. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: ' W H E ^ * ^ ^ S ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ] ^ ^ & E e » J ^ E D 
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JUDGE BILLINGS: N0|. THE LIMITATION WAS THAT 
THERE WOULD NOT BE QUESTIONING AS TO THAT AREA BECAUSE OF 
THE POSSIBLE PREJUDICIAL RESPONSE THAT IT MIGHT ELICIT. 
I'M CONCERNED ABOUT THE POINT OF THE RULING IN THE LETTER, 
WAS NOT ON THE RECORD, WAS IT, OUR DICUSSION OF YOUR 
ACCEPTANCE AND HOW THEY WERE ACCEPTED, BECAUSE I REALLY 
THOUGHT THAT AND THAT'S WHAT SHOCKED ME. I THOUGHT THEY 
WERE ACCEPTED SOLELY SO THERE COULD BE DISCUSSION OF THEM 
BUT YOU WERE NOT GOING TO ALLOW THEM TO GO TO THE JURY. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: I DON'T KNOW OF ANY RULE THAT 
ALLOWS AN EXHIBIT TO BE ACCEPTED FOR PURPOSES OF EXAMINATION 
AND NOT GO TO THE JURY. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: THEN COULD I SEE THE LETTERS 
AGAIN BEFORE THEY GO? I MIGHT HAVE ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS 
THAT AT LEAST I OUGHT TO PRESERVE. 3E?DTf 
^JM§&*.Mu& 
JUDGE BILLINGS: LET'S BRING THE LETTERS OVER 
AND YOU CAN TAKE WHATEVER EXCEPTIONS YOU WISH. 
THE COURT WILL NOTE THAT THE JURY HAS AT THIS 
TIME ALREADY RETIRED AND THAT THE PREVIOUS RULING IS AS 
THE COURT RULES HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: WELL, THERE ARE ADDITIONAL 
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CONCERNS AND OBJECTIONS I WOULD HAVE. ON THE THIRD PAGE 
OF THE LETTER WHICH HAS NOT EVEN BEEN—DIALOGUE HAS NOT • 
EVEN BEEN HAD ON THIS PART. LARRY TALKS ABOUT HIS DAD COM- ! 
ING TO VISIT, HE'S GOING OUT TO DAVIS COUNTY TO TALK TO 
THAT JUDGE, I'M ELIGIBLE FOR REVIEW NOW SO THINGS LOOK GOOD 
OUT THERE AND AGAIN A REFERENCE TO THE MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE 
WHICH I THOUGHT WAS NOT GOING TO COME INTO THIS TRIAL. 
AND THE REST OF THAT LETTER—I TOTALLY OBJECT 
TO THE REST OF THAT LETTER WHICH IS NOT A DISCUSSION OF 
THIS INCIDENT AT ALL. T^^'^^m^atSSVS^Vf^SS^^If^rKf AND 
I THINK IT'S TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE THAT ANY OF THIS GOES 
TO THE JURY, PARTICULARLY, <mt#n{*mr£iXH'jKm?n**mi 
THAT'S ON DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 16S. 
AND REGARDING 17S I HAVE A CONCERN BECAUSE NOW 
THE STATEMENT, "I FEEL I'VE LET A LOT OF PEOPLE DOWN INCLUD-
ING YOU" WILL GO INTO THE JURY WITH NO EXPLANATION AT ALL 
OF WHICH THAT IS REFERRING TO, AND CERTAINLY HAD I KNOWN 
THE LETTER WOULD HAVE GONE TO THE JURY, THERE WOULD HAVE 
BEEN NO POINT IN ASKING THAT IT NOT BE DISCUSSED. IT 
WOULDN'T HAVE MADE SENSE. _ 
THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PARTS OF THIS LETTER IN WHICH 
THERE ARE ROMANTIC KINDS OF CONNOTATIONS, FANTASY, HIS 
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FEELINGS TOWARD HER. THE REFERENCES IN THAT LETTER WHICH 
fc*i X-, iN&gSB&EBXSBKi 
zamBraesBEai*. 
-BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE LIMITA-
TIONS WERE THEN IF THE COURT MADE THEM SUBJECT—AND I THINK 
THAT IS ON THE RECORD—THAT YOU SAID THEY WERE RECEIVED 
SUBJECT TO THE SAME LIMITS AS THE OTHER ONE. AND IT APPEARS 
NOW THERE WERE NO LIMITATIONS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE LIMITATIONS— 
MS. NESSET-SALE: OTHER THAN THAT ONE SENTENCE. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE LIMITATIONS THE COURT FEELS 
WERE QUITE CLEAR. AND MR. IWASAKI COULD NOT ASK THE QUES-
TIONS ABOUT THE SECOND LETTER, THAT HE WAS PROHIBITED FROM 
ASKING ABOUT THE FIRST LETTER AS THE COURT'S FEELING IS 
THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THESE DOCUMENTS WERE RECEIVED, THAT 
DOCUMENTS THAT WERE RECEIVED GO TO THE JURY JjfrrOf^j 
WiEZM$@&gg&$ WHAT PORTION WOULD BE EXPUNGED, 
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PLUG INTO YOUR BRAIN IN ASSIMILATING THIS INFORMATION HOW 
TERRY HARRIS RESPONDS TO YOUR DESCRIPTION AND YOUR OBSERVA-
TIONS OF MR. JENSEN? 
A YES, MA'AM. 
Q WHAT WAS YOUR PURPOSE IN DOING THAT? 
A FOR RESPONSE. 
Q WOULD THAT INCLUDE IF SHE CHANGED HER MIND OR 
BROKE DOWN AND SAID I HAD NO IDEA HE WAS LIKE THAT THAT YOU 
MIGHT BE MORE LIKELY TO GET THE TRUTH? 
MR. IWASAKI: YOUR HONOR, I AM GOING TO OBJECT 
AT THIS POINT IN TIME. I THINK THIS AGAIN IS PRIOR— 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THAT OBJECTION WILL BE SUSTAINED. 
I THINK YOU'RE SPENDING TOO MUCH TIME. 
TQ~] 
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>*l&£&^Zlnkaai^„frii>>-»X&** •— Q lasas^aHuS^s^ 
A ~~~ 
Q WHAT DID YOU TELL—YOU OR MR. IWASAKI—WHAT DID 
THE TEAM TELL HER ABOUT MR. JENSEN HAVING BEEN IN PRISON? 
A I DON'T REMEMBER VERBATIM BUT YOU COULD READ IT 
FROM THE DEPOSITION. 
Q PAGE 25. DID YOU SAY, "" 
ON THE BOTTOM OF THE PAGE. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
SHE RESPONDED SHE DIDN'T KNOW THAT, DIDN'T SHE? 
YES, MA'AM. 
m£0. 
m^t£MmmED 
I'D HAVE TO READ THROUGH THE DEPOSITION 
**W'i**«^il»!*<!i« 
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IN CAMERA CONFERENCE 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE DEFENSE HAS A MOTION WHICH 
THE COURT IS RULING ON OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: IN THE DEPOSITION WHICH IS PRO-
POSED EXHIBIT 15 THERE IS AN ANSWER BY TERRY HARRIS IN RE-
SPONSE TO A QUESTION, YOU KNEW HE WAS IN JAIL FOR SOMETHING 
HER RESPONSE YEAH, I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST FOR PAROLE, HE 
DIDN'T WANT ME TO KNOW. 
I GUESS I'M ASKING THE COURT TO ALLOW THE STATEMENT, 
"I THOUGHT IT WAS JUST FOR PAROLE" TO BE WHITED OUT AND 
STRICKEN BECAUSE IT IS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT WHICH THE 
JURY MIGHT BELIEVE AND GIVE WEIGHT TO. 
HE HAS NEVER BEEN TO PRISON, NEVER-BEEN CONVICTED 
OF A- FELONY AND IS NOT AND HAS NEVER BEEN"ON PAROLE. 
AND THE SAME WAY I•M ASKING THE"SECOND REFERENCE 
TO THAT ON PAGE 26 AFTER MR. TOLMAN HAS ASKED, "DID YOU KNOW 
HE HAD BEEN IN PRISON"—AND MR. IWASAKI ASKED, "YOU-KNEW 
HE WAS ON PAROLE," "YEAH, I KNEW HE WAS ON PAROLE." THAT 
THOSE TWO, THE QUESTION AND THE ANSWER, ALSO WE DELETED 
EITHER WHITED OUT AND REXEROXED OR COVERED WITH WHITE. I 
THINK IT HAS TO BE WHITED OUT. IT CAN'T BE TEMPORARILY 
PAPERED OVER, BUT I THINK THAT" REFERS- TO MATTERS THAT ARE 
NOT TRUE AND BE PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: YOU WANT TO SPEAK, MR. IWASAKI? 
0/1 Q 
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smog. 
THJjraCTFTS^^^ 
JSSET^ 
^»^IIPtPMiIil a^^WOOLD^^^^ 
l!3H»g&«4M»*^^ 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THE COURT WILL ALLOW THE WHITING 
OUT OF THE SENTENCE DEALING WITH PAROLE AS COURT FEELS THAT 
IT WOULD BE MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBATIVE ON TWO GROUNDS. 
FIRST, THAT IT LEAVES AN UNTRUE INFERENCE BEFORE 
THE JURY, AND SECONDLY, THE"COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY'RULED'THAT 
THERE COULD BE NO PRIOR'QUESTIONING"AS'TO'THE MISDEMEANORS. 
AND THIS WOULD INDIRECTLY' BRING THAT'BEFORE THE'JURY. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: YOUR HONOR, I ALSO, AS I READ 
THIS THE NEXT QUESTION AND ANSWER WAS, "HOW DID YOU KNOW 
THAT," REFERRING TO THAT HE WAS ON PAROLE. "HE TOLD ME." 
IT'S-- ' 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THAT'S OKAY. JUST TAKE OUT, "HE 
WAS ON PAROLE." 
MS. NESSET-SALE: THAT'S THE COMPLETE EXCHANGE. 
I THINK IT SHOULD BEGIN WITH, "WHAT DID HE TELL YOU IT WAS 
FOR"; IS THAT CORRECT? 
JUDGE BILLINGS: YES. 
(RECESS). 
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OBSERVED. 
Q I SEE. AND AT THAT TIME DID YOU THINK THAT RAP 
SHEET BELONGED TO THAT DEFENDANT? 
A YES, SIR, I DID. 
Q IN FACT, HAD THE SAME NAME, DIDN'T IT? 
A YES, SIR. 
Q AND YOU SINCE LEARNED THAT THAT RAP SHEET DID NOT 
APPLY TO THAT DEFENDANT? 
A YES, SIR.' 
MR. IWASAKI: I HAVE NO MORE QUESTIONS. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I HAVE ONE OTHER QUESTION, YOUR 
HONOR, AND I'LL BE BRIEF. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MS. NESSET-SALE: 
Q MR. TOLMAN, LET ME SHOW YOU WHAT IS MARKED AS 
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED EXHIBIT 20D. DO YOU RECOGNIZE THIS 
STYLE OF DOCUMENT? 
A YES, MA'AM. 
Q WHAT IS IT? 
A 
Q JtfHO IS THE SUBJECT OF THAT PARTICULxAR RAP SHEET? 
I THINK THAT THE DOCUMENT CAN SPEAK FOR ITSELF, AND IF SHE'S 
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GOING TO OFFER IT IN EVIDENCE SHOULD LAY MORE FOUNDATION 
II^TT^^ TO^THTS^SPENDAM*-
JUDGE BILLINGS: I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT IT IS. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: MAY I SHOW IT TO THE COURT? 
(WHEREUPON, A DISCUSSION WAS HELD BETWEEN 
COURT AND COUNSEL AT THE BENCH, OUTSIDE 
THE HEARING OF THE JURY, AFTER WHICH THE 
FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD): 
MS. NESSET-SALE: IN LIGHT OF THE COURT'S RULING 
I HAVE NO OTHER QUESTIONS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THANK YOU. 
MR. IWASAKI: I HAVE NO OTHER QUESTIONS. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: MAY THE WITNESS BE EXCUSED? 
MR. IWASAKI: I DON'T INTEND TO CALL HIM, YOUR 
HONOR. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I HAVE NO OBJECTION. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH, DETECTIVE 
TOLMAN. YOU MAY BE EXCUSED. 
MR. IWASAKI: YOUR HONOR, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING 
THAT DETECTIVE JUDD HAS SINCE ARRIVED. IF I CAN SEE IF HE'S 
GOT THAT DOCUMENT? 
JUDGE BILLINGS: YES. 
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TIME? 
MR. IWASAKI: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. NESSET-SALE: YES. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THANK YOU. DOES THE STATE HAVE 
ANY FURTHER WITNESSES? 
fl^M*ffi%ffifrffi 
ftfeMt&k L-MA 
aurfiw ^ mMm&mMmm&mm$mmmMm** 
^mmmmmmmmm£m&mmm&i 
3 WAS nPffBBiiin Mfl> ,a.v.cv.TyvsTi 
MR. IWASAKI: I HAVE NO FURTHER WITNESSES, YOUR 
HONOR. WE REST. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: THANK YOU. WOULD YOU LIKE TO 
TAKE A SHORT RECESS BEFORE BEGINNING WITH YOUR CASE, 
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MS. NESSET-SALE? 
MS. NESSET-SALE: PLEASE. 
JUDGE BILLINGS: I WILL CAUTION YOU AGAIN, PLEASE 
DOM'T DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH EACH OTHER OR WITH ANYONE 
ELSE AND THAT MEANS NOT JUST THE PEOPLE INVOLVED IN THIS 
PROCEEDING BUT ANYONE YOU MIGHT MEET IN THE HALLWAY. COURT 
WILL BE IN RECESS. 
(RECESS). 
IN CAMERA CONFERENCE 
JUDGE BILLINGS: WE ARE HERE FN CHAMBERS SUUgESfi^ 
QILAEJI. 
m.j~mMm£mJmz3mKmmM^ AND 
22 
THERE IS CERTAINLY CASE LAW WHICH I HAVE AT THE OFFICE. 
masimsssssaBSsm i^^m 
a t i l j" 11.' : '«T5Sg'?!l»^fy*.Wl"vy:*^^ 
mm- seafiS«^W3W» 
tmuamsm 
&WM?*mm& 
•~—••**;•'•-,i&i.,j&*"" 
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..IP 
JES&ll lRJPP^.^ J THINK 
©PKCftrfE 
MR. IWASAKI: MY RESPONSE TO THAT IS, YOUR HONOR, 
THAT THAT PHOTOGRAPH WAS—IT WAS INTRODUCED BY MS. 
NESSET-SALE, IT WAS MARKED AS A DEFENSE EXHIBIT, WAS SHOWN 
TO SEVERAL WITNESSES, WAS TESTIFIED TO BY THOSE WITNESSES 
AND ONCE SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION WAS LAID THROUGH NOT ONLY 
HER QUESTIONING BUT MINE AS WELL THAT IT WAS PROPER FOR TT 
TO BE RECEIVED. IF SHE WANTED IT KEPT OUT SHE SHOULDN'T 
HAVE OFFERED IT OR AT LEAST INTRODUCED IT OR TESTIFIED TO 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I NEVER INTRODUCED IT. I HAD 
I' MARKED. WHAT I WOULD HAVE DONE IF, IN FACT, I HAD EVER 
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MADE A DECISION WHERE IT WAS CRUCIAL TO HAVE IT IN WOULD 
HAVE ASKED THAT IT BE CUT O F F — T H E PORTION THAT INDICATED 
THAT- IT WAS A MUG SEI^T — SO" TT LOOKED ^ IKJE ^ ^EiiOTCGPAOH . Al£ 
rja^DCTjUaHET" VQ0EIOBBK3DBBWI ' L*"~ *. ^ i • 
BUT THIS HAS THE DATE, IT FNDICATES A PR D " 'ATE 
THINK I HAVE AN ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO HAVE THINGS MARKED TO HELP 
WITNESSES DISCUSS THEM, TO HEAR THE TESTIMONY AND TO CHOOSE 
1
 T 0 A D MIT T H E M . A N D " T H A1 I HI V D I I 0 T 0 F F E R E D T H A T 
EXHIBIT, IT HAS NOT BEEN CLEANSED AND I THINK IT IS VERY 
DAMAGING THE WAY IT IS. 
MR. IWASAKI: AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, WHEN I OFFERED 
IT THE COURT GAVE MS. NESSET-SALE AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBJECT 
IT) IT WHICH CO! JI ,D HA "\ /'E BEEi: I DOI IE, T I IT S BEING, BEFORE IT 
BEING PUBLISHED TO THE JURY, AND WHICH SHE DID NOT CHOOSE 
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE Ot E I THINK SHE PROBABLY WAIVED ANY OB-
TiTH'lnr] th\ WOULD \\A\\\ HAD \JU L\ m I HE EACI 3HE DIDN'T MAKE 
THE OBJECTION. 
MS. NESSET-SALE : ; ^ D 
JUDGE BILLINGS: WAS IT PUBLISHED TO TI IE JURY? 
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MR. IWASAKI: IT WAS- YOUR HONOR, WITH THE COURT'S 
PERMISSION, 
JUDGE BILLINGS: WELI THE COURT UNFORTUNATELY — 
QUITE FRANKLY, THE COURT ASSUMED THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD NO 
OBJECTION SINCE * 0 PERCENT OF THE TESTIMONY A BOI JT THE EXHIBIT 
HAS . . jj^. . .
 ti L-f ILNSE COUNSEL. THE COURT FEELS THAT 
COUNSEL HAD SOME SORT OF OBLIGATION TO INDICATE TO THE COURT 
THE NATI IRE OF TI IE OBJECTION BEFORE THE COI, JRT ADMITTEE • IT. 
THE COURT, THEREFORE, WILL RECEIVE THE EXHIBIT BUT WILL HAVE 
THE EXHIBIT, BEFORE IT IS FURTHER SHOWN Tn "THE JURY, EXPUNGED 
P\/ VRT THAT WOULD IN.- J. _.,:.-, •.:.-. . . JG PHOTO AND, 
/HEREFORE, THE EXHIBIT WILL BE CLEANSED BEFORE IT GOES INTO 
THE JURY ROOM WITf I TI IE , JI JRO* : ir^Mtt^1 
MS. NESSET-SALE: I HAVE NOTHING ELSE AT THIS TIME 
(WHEREUPON, THE IN CAMERA CONFERENCE WMID 
CONCLUDED). 
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L i . c r . a r d .; .; e n 
? r 3 >-•. 2 lS0 
.):'c;[ . Z i'\ -020 
IJ LdiiTUiCT JUURT Li1 THE THIKJJ JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN rtlll) ?(m SAi.T l.AKii; COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
5TAT ii 0} UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
V:i -
T lCRAi lD I ,. JBtfSEN 
Jefendarvt
 f 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO PRODUCE 
DOCUMENTS TO PERFECT ADDENDUM 
TO SUPREME COURT APPEAL• 
CRIMINAL CASE N~. ^85-348. 
JUDGE: Judi th Billings 
VOMLK. .* .i . IC i iAR. L . J i N ^ r ^ , . ^ f ^ n : I/*- L T > iLw,-) 
):pt.L^ji.t i -1'i; ^, ar.u taH" - she , •> u n l e a r n e d ,._ ,r:e
 ACIA, K - A 15 J r~ , »•? 
J'.r -. i. ii -;1 \ e .AL k * 1 " t ik - ~ . j L'aj t .* * jn . 1 1 : r t : . n 
l . , U ' I ; ; . i a r i c , ' o - t 
- a l l i e s 
, t : . - v i w 
i;.as-)crn "t? 1 
aoruoy ^ . f . . . i t h i s C o u r t f o r an Order 
-pyf 4-;ni : Airw' d o c u m e n t s ; 
.nu : e ,:.:. t,r_cic u i o t a n t
 n a s e and ccmr le t - r f i l e . I ) C ,o< 
i) Copy - / g m a l laru! w r i t t e n P o l i c e r e p o r t s of trie I n s t a n t Tr;.se, 
•») T r a i l e r i i of Le . t o :u m g H e a r i n g h e l d .-n ,e : * :":*, V ^ 
i.) T r a i i o c : 1 , ' of .' 1. s in^ Arguirents •*•: .ns-.-ant, ; a ^ e . 
>) C o ^ - ; - c e i p t : o r _ r o p e r t y t a k e n tr^::< ihe Defendan t aad ^ e a s 
i w i c mu'i : '-. ' r . a . „ Not.--: : .. - .-- ' 7 - / 4 - 5 . 
:;) Copy '..... i r e s e n t e n c e R e p o r t • 
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;
."] opy of '.. F o t i c e f r o m Pr o s e c i 111 on c on c e rn lug t i i e u s e o f" t J i e I) e fen dai i t s "' 
Alxt )I Wl t:ness T e r r i Harr j s a s Sta t e s 1 i vj triess a ] so \ ocord ing t :: 
U.C ft 7 / - 14 - 2 ( . 2 ) . ( 3 ) 
- •-., . . , ,.,,.. .-. . , ^ e . s e d o c u m e n t s f ^ ^ T rip.04" 
•c , -. . e s e n t c o u r s e , " na^ ceen s e l e c t i v e l y ignore*. ;-v oot. * 
u . i u c t i.: ": T~+an ^ t a i e b a r . .,i. -l"w J , 
A. ^ - . ,r ^
 J B N S E N > p R A y S j t n < 3 o c u r t w i l l CR?1R these d , - c -
menlp V-> pro u;e: .- .• + 1~- J c u r t w i l l secure n : s n g n t s .m:e/ tne xor-
. t.i.t..u..)n ^ ' " ne Sc^U- " * \ . ; . u,-l the Uni tes S t a t e s , 
Tf V>;:. ::ja1 t e r marmot I t -esolvtr-i oy wr ie r 1\- .. ...•u..,:f 
~ hoi: t r . je . ; *niarit r e q u ^ t s a r e a r i n g , t : i s c u s s w.:y ^ne •.-;..:* would 
- efw...-3c .. - vootif;: : - . : . .*•; . <r. / a ^ r to i^ren-i aims e l f for 
:;•: .':;S.,c. ada i .v a;i Adaeride;a I . ;_ .3 „ .preme ;our t ADD^ax. J A TED 
RICHARD L. JENSK o > ^ — 
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FJ'IDWIT 
^c xc^ ri _L. uensen 
Jlierit, 
7 • 
5ar^ Xiaz 
Attorney. 
I, 3arl Xiaz, tne -ttorme^ ..n ti.e aoove ;Iflaa^it st^te: 
Inat 1 realize that my "Hint nay not use tne remeay of a Habeas 
Corpus as a substitute for a Direct appeal. Inat a petitioner 
cannot raise issues m a Haoeas oroceedmg that could or should 
nave been raised on Jirect Appeal. 
ly Jlient nab nad trie desire to raioe other ^ssueo like, 
Ineffectiveness of Jounsel, Illegal Deposition, irrp-rorer t-ff^ r of 
^rr&ence, Prosecutor's Failure to Jisclose -w^dence Fav-Q3?3r£4e--w mv 
Jlient, and ^ye^itness Fr~a^ ii±~t;y mstrtte-fcTon, Dut I have lscouragea 
him from goms m that direction oecause I feel it wairir^ -~be~~ a. u&&± e 
of time a m tnev are very weaK Doints for tnis Jirect Appeal remedy. 
In y ID rot fj.t the rules i^ r jirect ooeal joints. > 
My Client under my uroction npJ left tn^^e ooints out 
because I have advised him to. If at a later date tnere arises a^ 
controversy from another court, 1 taKe full resronsioilit ln -* vy ' 
Clients1 failure to Dnng ur> hi^ r o-iner point/. 
I sign this Affidavit with no i estivations as to ,y pro-
fessional ethicjs and knowleage of tne direct Appeal process ana 
_^ 9^eedrrrHS. tfrfct will be availaole at any time to answer any Quest-
ions as to my judgements i\ ^oharc 1. Jensens' supreme Jourt ^ppeal 
or any other remedy. 
^ o i < */ x 
^Axih Xljt-Z ^ i t t o r n e ^ / A t Law 
WII IM^OJ : AO j i b m n g 
u x . . i l r b D l l , 
LII JLulv l J ^ l o . ^ A r i . - ^ : 
, _ ^ ^ _ ^ . , » . - * . - • -«- - * - - * . — * - - * - - « - * - - * - • + - • * • * + * * ~* - 4 
- A-X-X--?r-J(--*r^T-X-A--/--A-Jf-t--^-^-7 ,r7r-/(-A-^rX--^-
f L ^ / I T .<S TC : u t ^ . T I E S S 
C^ 1 Cli?3SIG XIKZ1 n P P ^ ^ . 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
OT \1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
YENGICH, RICH, XAiZ & METOS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
72 E. 4 0 0 SO., SUITE 355 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84 1 1 1 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 355-0320 
ONALD J. YENGICH 
RADLEY P. RICH 
ARL XAIZ 
;. FRED METOS 
Richard Lawrence Jensen 
c / o U t a h St at e Pr iso n 
P.O. Box 2 50 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Richar di 
I have received your letter, not dated, in which you have 
requested that I sign an affidavit which you have prepared. 
Should the affidavit be accurate and otherwise acceptable I 
w i11 be more than happy to s ign it. 
With response to your continuing fears that I have perhaps 
misled or improperly advised you, let me respond b r i e f 1 ^  r, 11 
is correct that, on a writ of habeas corpus, matters that could 
have and should have, been raised on appeal cannot be raised 
for the first time on. a writ , 'However, the issue you intend on 
raising deals with matters that do not form a part of the record 
at trial a ~.d , theref ore , canno t be raised, on d i rect appea 1 
*s • r.old you before, because your arguments deal with 
things that Jo Carol did or did not do, you need to have a post-
appeal hearing to make a record before resolving the writ. 
"'( s, 
EARL XAIZ 
' x-7 
l-.y. ;mc 
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